Steve Smith, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment. “It was typical use of the Apaches,” recalled Lt. Risky operations behind enemy lines were the focal point. Some went after artillery, for example, while others attacked mechanized units. The exercise was a dress rehearsal for the war, with units practicing roles they anticipated they would fulfill in Iraq. In January and February 2003, Apaches from the 101st Airborne, the 11th Aviation Regiment, and other units participated in an exercise called Victory Scrimmage at the Army’s training range in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Before any Air Force or Navy aircraft had dropped their bombs, a fleet of Apaches had slipped into Iraq and attacked key nodes of the air defense system-the opening shots of the war.Īrmy commanders expected the Apaches to play a similar role in Gulf War II. At combat altitudes of less than a hundred feet, Apaches can often sneak below an enemy’s radar coverage, which made them the weapon of choice in the opening phase of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It also carries a millimeter-wave radar for improved performance during bad weather and other poor-visibility situations. The newer and more advanced version-the AH-64D Longbow-can track and process up to 256 different targets at once. The helicopter can carry 16 fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, each capable of taking out a tank. Whatever its limitations, few deny that the Apache is a fearsome weapon system. Rumsfeld’s goal of making the military more nimble and versatile.
Those are precisely the kinds of issues facing defense planners as they attempt to fulfill Defense Secretary Donald H. McPeak after the war, “should restrict the Apache to close air support-or, if it must go deep, hand it over for joint tasking.” “ The Army,” wrote former Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill A. They argue that the Apache is a relic of Cold War planning that failed at its primary mission-deep attack. “We were flexible and adaptable in the way that we used them.”īut critics of the multimillion dollar chopper view the Najaf retreat as the Apache’s “Little Big Horn”-proof that it is too vulnerable to survive modern combat. Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, during a briefing after the war. “Our Apaches did great for us,” said Maj. The other helicopters in the raid retreated before the mission could be accomplished.ĭespite this failed mission, the Army insists the Apache was indispensable during the war, providing critical close air support for ground troops engaged in combat and armed reconnaissance by helping to destroy Iraqi armor and other key equipment lurking on the edges of the battlefield. That opening gave the Iraqis one of their few battlefield victories of the war.Ī fusillade of small-arms and anti-aircraft fire downed one Apache and its two-man crew. The corridor near Najaf that the Apaches planned to fly through was modestly populated, so commanders decided against the usual suppression fire-mainly artillery-used to silence enemy forces that could threaten the helicopters. Wallace, the Army’s V Corps commander, ordered 32 AH-64 Apaches from the 11th Aviation Regiment to mount an attack behind enemy lines against the Iraqi Republican Guard Medina Division. There’s little dispute about what happened. That aborted mission has become the subject of one of the most controversial postwar debates. Small-arms and anti-aircraft fire downed one Apache, and the other helicopters retreated, some damaged so seriously they had to be grounded for weeks.
During Gulf War II, the Army sent its Apache helicopters to mount a “deep attack” against an Iraqi unit.
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